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I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose that in early October, the Chief Executive Officer of a
publicly traded company instructs his' stockbroker to sell ten thousand
shares of his company stock immediately following the November
presidential election. The trade is made pursuant to a pre-existing plan
to diversify his stock holdings. After the time that he places the order,
but shortly before its execution, the executive learns negative and
material, non-public information about his company. If the executive
does not take any action to prevent the impending stock transaction, is
he guilty of unlawful insider trading? Although he possessed material,
non-public information at the time the transaction was consummated, his
trade was not on the basis of, or because of, the information.
The disposition of this case would likely turn on whether the court
adopts a "knowing possession" or an "actual use" standard with respect
to the information held by the executive. Although the common law has
consistently held that a conviction for insider trading requires proof of a
causal connection between the information and the trade, a recent line
of cases supports the position, espoused by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), that the SEC need only prove that a defendant
accused of insider trading possessed material non-public information at
the time he executed the trade-not that he actually used it.3
1. This Article uses the masculine pronoun "he" for simplicity's sake; it does not
indicate any sort of gender bias.

2. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding

that Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (section 10(b)),
requires that the government prove causation in insider trading prosecutions); SEC v.

Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (indicating that a violation of
section 10(b) occurs when insiders act on material inside information).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993)
(reasoning that a requirement of a causal connection between the information and the
trade could frustrate prosecution attempts); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 524
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Specifically, these cases indicate that proof of "knowing possession" by
the SEC satisfies the element of scienter traditionally required by the
common law. This Comment analyzes whether the SEC's "knowing
possession" standard or the common law's "actual use" standard should
be employed to prove unlawful insider trading.
This Comment endorses the legislative adoption of an initial
rebuttable presumption in favor of the complainant in insider trading
cases. This presumption would create a strong inference of "actual use"
upon proof that the defendant was in possession of material and nonpublic information at the time he consummated a securities transaction.
Moreover, the inference would establish a prima facie case of insider
trading sufficient to withstand summary judgment. This Comment
argues that such a presumption is appropriate as it is consistent with the
plain language of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345
and SEC Rule lOb-5. 6 Further, it has the effect of easing the nearimpossible burden, traditionally assigned to the complainant, of proving
the defendant's state of mind. This Comment will show that although
such a presumption has only been applied in a limited number of insider
trading cases, it provides a fair alternative in both criminal and civil
contexts.
II. INSIDER TRADING
The current law prohibiting insider trading has been developed largely
through common law interpretation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (section 10(b)), and Rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder by the SEC (Rule lOb-5). Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, to use or employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, to make any untrue statement
of a material fact (or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (predicating summary judgment with respect to defendant's lOb-5

liability on a showing that he traded while in knowing possession of material non-public
information); SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that

the defendant violated Rule lOb-5 by trading "while in possession of material, nonpublic information").
4. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. The Supreme Court has held that section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies only to practices that involve scienter and
"cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
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make a statement not misleading), or to engage in a fraudulent or
deceitful act, practice, or course of business.7 Violation of these rules
may result in criminal charges, injunctive relief, seizure of related
profits, monetary penalties, and/or private civil damage actions.'
A.

Duty to Disclose orAbstain

In In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,9 the SEC interpreted Rule lOb-5 to
impose an affirmative duty on corporate insiders either to disclose
material non-public information to persons with whom they conduct
business, or to forego the transaction altogether.'0 The Commission

indicated that this obligation is predicated on two elements: (1) the
existence of a relationship that provides access to non-public inside
information "intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone," and (2) "the inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.""
Despite the SEC's stated concern over the inherent unfairness
associated with possession of non-public information, the Supreme
Court has declined to extend the duty to "disclose or abstain" to all
market participants. Specifically, in Chiarella v. United States,2 the
Court held that "a duty to disclose under [section] 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of non[-]public market information."' 3 Rather,
a duty arises from a specific relationship of trust and confidence between
the parties, similar to a fiduciary relationship (e.g., the relationship
between an insider and the purchaser or seller of his company's stock).
The Supreme Court has expressed concern that a contrary rule would
have a chilling effect on the role of market analysts, a role considered
essential to the "preservation of a healthy market."' 5
1.

"Constructive Fiduciary"Liability

Recently, courts have extended the duty to "disclose or abstain" to16
persons who can reasonably be defined as "constructive fiduciaries."'
7.
8.

See id.
See Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a Causation Element in

the Prohibitionon InsiderTrading?, 52 Bus. LAw. 1235, 1236 (1997).
9. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
10. See id. at 911.
11. Id. at912.
12.

445 U.S. 222 (1980).

14.

See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983).

13. Id. at 235.
15. Id. at 658.
16.
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In SEC v. Lund,'7 for example, a California federal district court
expanded the concept of "insider" to include professionals (e.g.,
accountants, attorneys, and consultants) who require access to inside
information in order to accomplish the corporate tasks they were hired to
perform.' 8 Thus, the court held that when an outsider is privy to
information he knows or should know was conveyed in confidence for a
business purpose, he assumes the role of a "temporary insider" with a
concomitant duty to disclose or abstain.' 9
2.

Tipper/Tippee Liability

Recent decisions have also held that a "tippee" (i.e., a person who
receives information from a corporate insider) assumes a fiduciary duty
to corporate shareholders not to trade on material and non-public
information when "the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach." 20 In Dirks v. SEC,2'
the Court indicated that the test of whether the tippee has assumed the
insider's fiduciary duty to the corporate shareholders is "whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure."
The Court reasoned, "Absent some personal gain, there
has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach."
3.

Liability Based on the MisappropriationofInfonnation

More recently, courts have imposed liability based on the
misappropriation of non-public information. 4
Under the
revealed legitimately to an outsider working for the corporation, the outsider may
become a fiduciary of the shareholders); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that an outsider is clothed "with temporary insider status when the
outsider obtains access to confidential information solely for corporate purposes"); SEC
v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 863-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (extending liability under
the insider trading laws to a non-employee consultant of the corporation).
17. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
18. See id. at 1402-03.
19. Id. at 1403.
20. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
21. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
22. Id. at 662.
23. Id.
24.

See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642 (1997)

(extending
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misappropriation theory, "A company's confidential information...
qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive
use."'
Accordingly, the unauthorized use of such information
"constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement. 2 6
The misappropriation theory predicates liability on the breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, rather than the
fiduciary duty owed by an insider to a purchaser or seller of his
company's stock.' Thus, primary liability under the insider trading laws
can attach to a person who trades in securities for personal profit using
material and non-public information without disclosing such use to the
source of the information, in breach of the person's fiduciary duty to the
source.2
In SEC v. Falbo,29 for example, the SEC brought a civil action alleging
insider trading violations against Falbo, an electrical contractor
employed by Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. (Grand Met). 0 Falbo's wife
was employed as the secretary of Howard Chandler, an executive of
Grand Met.3 In this position, she had access to highly sensitive and
confidential information, including details related to a planned tender
offer for the Pillsbury Company's (Pillsbury) common stock.32 Through
eavesdropping and conversations with his wife, Falbo learned of the
planned acquisition and, prior to the planned acquisition date, engaged
in large purchases of both Pillsbury common stock and options to
purchase such stock." As a result of these trades, Falbo realized over
$165,000 in profits.Y The court reasoned that at the time of his stock
and option purchases, Falbo possessed material, non-public information
obtained in violation of his own duty and of his wife's duty of
confidentiality and loyalty to Grand Met.35 This "fraud on the source"
was held sufficient to sustain liability under Rule lOb-5 because it met
the statutory requirement that there be deceptive conduct in connection
insider trading liability to an attorney who misappropriated confidential corporate
information from the corporation's attorneys); United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83,
85-88 (2d Cir. 1997) (convicting the tippee friend of the corporation's District Manager);
United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 665-68 (2d Cir. 1996) (extending insider trading
liability to a tippee friend of the corporation's Vice President of Labor Relations).
25. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 654.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
See id. at 652-53.
See id. at 652.

31.
32.

See id. at513.
See id. at 515.

29. 14 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
30. See id. at513, 517.
33. See id. at 516-17, 521-22.

34. See id. at 517.
35. See id. at 522-23.
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with a securities transaction.36
Based solely upon the "traditional" or "classical" theory37 of insider
trading, Falbo could not have been convicted. Regardless of whether the
court found him to be an insider of Grand Met or a tippee, his fiduciary
duty would extend only to the shareholders of Grand Met, not to the
shareholders of Pillsbury with whom he transacted.
Thus, the
misappropriation theory represents a significant extension of insider

trading liability.
B. MaterialInformation
Pursuant to Rule 10b-5(b), it is illegal "[t]o make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made... not misleading."38 The SEC and the
courts have interpreted this subsection to limit insider trading violations
to situations in which the defendant possessed material information at
the time of the trade.39 But, what constitutes material information? As
the rule does not provide a definition, it is left to the trier of fact to
determine on a case by case basis whether the information at issue is
material.40 Courts have adopted a variety of tests to determine
materiality, application
of which is largely dependent upon the specific
4
facts of the case. '
1.

The "Reasonable Shareholder"

In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.4' the Supreme Court
articulated the basic test of materiality to be whether a reasonable
shareholder would attach importance to the information in deciding how
36.
37.

Id. at 524.
Under the "traditional" or "classical" theory of insider trading, a fiduciary

relationship between the insider and the purchaser or seller of the company's stock is
necessary to sustain insider trading liability. See discussion supra Part II.A.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1998).
39. See SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
liability for insider trading can be based only on materialinformation known at the time

of the trade); In re Cady, Roberts, & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (stating that the duty

to disclose or abstain only relates to materialfacts).
40. See Dariusz M. Budzen & Ania M. Frankowska, ProhibitionsAgainst Insider
Trading in the United States and the European Community: Providing Guidance for

Legislaturesof Eastern Europe, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 91, 103 (1994).

41. See id.
42. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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to act.43 The Court indicated that this definition would encompass any
fact that would assume "actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder," or would be viewed by the reasonable investor
as "having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."
Material information is not limited to statements
concerning the value of a security, but also includes those facts that
"affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect
the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities."'5
With respect to speculative information, materiality will "depend at any
given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
the totality of the company activity."'
2.

The "Wait and See" Approach

Several lower courts have endorsed a "wait and see approach" 47 to
measure the materiality of confidential information. Under this
approach, materiality is judged based upon the actual market impact of
4
the information when it is eventually disclosed to the public.*
Accordingly, in order to determine whether the information in question
was material, courts have considered whether actual public disclosure of49
the information resulted in significant movement in the stock price.
However, application of this approach must be limited to situations in
which it can be shown that the movement in the stock price directly
resulted from dissemination of the specific information held by the
defendant at the time of the trade. 0 Thus, in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb
Inc.," the Second Circuit rejected the SEC's contention that "since

43. See id. at 449.
44. Id.
45. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980)
(indicating that a relevant question in determining materiality is whether actual
disclosure of the information impacted the decisions of potential buyers and sellers);
SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1401 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (considering the market's actual
reaction to public disclosure of the information in determining its materiality).
48. See SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1146 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
49. See Elkind, 635 F.2d at 166-67 (finding information not material partly

because its release did not impact stock price); Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1401 (concluding
that the increase in trading volume and price of the corporation's stock following
disclosure of the information confrmed the information's materiality).
50. See Hoover, 903 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (reasoning that since the information that
the defendant had when he traded was not the same information that was later publicly
disclosed, the SEC must rely on statistical analysis to determine what the market reaction
would have been if the defendant's information had been publicly disclosed).
51.
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[Bausch & Lomb's] stock dropped 11 3/4 points on March 16th with an
unprecedented volume of 348,000 shares traded, all the information
conveyed by [defendant] must per se have been material."52 The court
reasoned that "[tihe seemingly substantial decline in the value of
[Bausch & Lomb's] stock.., was not an uncommon phenomenon in the
The court cited several reasons,
company's recent history."53
independent of the information, which may also have accounted for the
decline, including reports that the Senate planned to investigate the
company's "monopolistic stranglehold on the soft contact lens market ' 4
and medical reports concerning the safety of soft contact lenses.55
3.

Materiality Based on InsiderReaction

The reactions of other insiders to the information may also provide a
reliable measure of materiality. 6 Accordingly, in SEC v. Hoover,7 a
Texas federal district court held information that Browning Ferris
Industries' (BFI) year-end earnings from continuing operations could be
zero to two percent lower than originally estimated in the company's
third quarter Form 10-Q5' to be immaterial. The court partly based its
decision on evidence that BFI's in-house attorney, who possessed
specific expertise in and responsibility for securities laws compliance,
had concluded that the zero to two percent revision was not material and
thus did not require immediate disclosure to the SEC.60
C. Non-Public Information
In passing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,61 Congress intended
to prevent "inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in
Rule lOb-5 was passed in
securities transactions generally." 62
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
SEC by

Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 18.
903 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
A 10-Q is an unaudited quarterly financial report required to be filed with the
corporations registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. See

BLACK'S LAW DIcTONARY

59.
60.
61.
62.

1481 (7th ed. 1999).

See Hoover, 903 F. Supp. at 1147-48.
See id. at 1148.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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furtherance of this goal, to ensure that "all investors.., have relatively

equal access to material information."63 Thus, liability under insider
trading laws arises only when the defendant trades while in possession
of non-public information. 64
The SEC has defined non-public information as information which has
not been disseminated in a manner making it accessible to the investing
public generally. 65 More specifically, in United States v. Cusimano,6 the
federal appeals court endorsed a district court jury instruction that
"'[i]nformation is non[-]public if it is not available to the public through
such sources as press releases, [SEC] filings, trade publications,
analysts' reports, newspapers, [and/or] magazines."'67
Even after information has been effectively disclosed to the public,
insiders may be temporarily precluded from acting on it.68 Especially in
situations in which the information is not readily translatable into
investment action, allowing investors to take advantage of their advance
opportunity to evaluate the information would be contrary to the
regulatory objective of "providing all investors with an equal
opportunity to make informed investment judgments."6'9 In order to
provide the public with additional protection from exploitation resulting
from an insider's advance notice of material information, courts can use
the time that an insider actually places an order, rather than the time
of
7
its ultimate execution, as determinative for purposes of Rule 10b-5. 1

63. Id. More recently, this goal has been criticized as unreasonable. See United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing inherent
"disparities in knowledge and the availability thereof at many levels of market
functioning that the law does not presume to address"), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); see

also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (rejecting the access to information
theory).
64. See United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1997) (indicating
that liability under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 is predicated on possession of non-

public information); United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that Rule lOb-5 requires a showing that the information in question was nonpublic); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that trading on
public information does not violate section 10(b)); SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp 867, 891
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that in order to establish an insider trading violation under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 plaintiff must show that defendant made improper use of
confidential material information).
65. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 633 (1971).
66. 123 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 89 n.6 (first alteration in original).
68. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18 (2d Cir. 1968).
69. Id. at 854.
70. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information
Practices:The Implicationsof the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding,51 VA. L. REV. 1271,

1291 (1965).

1086

Insider Trading

[VOL. 36: 1077, 1999]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Impoundment Theory

1.

Under the impoundment theory, information may be considered public
for purposes of section 10(b) even though there has been no public
disclosure and only a small number of people know of it.7' In
accordance with this theory, the issue is not the number of people who
possess the information, but whether their trading has caused it to be
fully "impounded" into the price of the particular stock.7 2 The rationale
is that once the information is fully reflected in the price of the stock, it
can no73 longer be misused by trading because no further profit can be
made.
2.

CorporateRumor

In order for information to be classified as non-public, it must be more
specific and more private than general rumor.7 Thus, in United States v.
Mylett,75 the Second Circuit held that confirmation by a corporate insider
of information on which the press merely speculated was sufficient to
satisfy the non-public requirement.76 However, the court indicated that
its decision was limited to situations in which the insider's information
Based on that holding, a
was "qualified, supported, and credible."
violation of the insider trading laws would probably not be found in a
situation in which an insider had made categorical statements that were
completely without foundation, but were, nonetheless, successfully used
by a trader.78
D. Security
1.

Statutory Definition

The imposition of insider trading liability is expressly limited to
actions pursued "in connection with the purchase or sale of any

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id.
See id.
See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996).
97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996).

76.

See id. at 666.

77.
78.

Id. at 667.
See id.
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security."79 The definition of "security" provided by section 10(b)
includes such instruments as notes, stocks, treasury stocks, bonds,
debentures, puts, calls, straddles, options, and privileges with respect to
a security or with respect to a group or index of securities.'
2.

Stock Appreciation Rights

Despite the broad statutory definition of security, in Clay v.
Riverwood InternationalCorp.,"' the Eleventh Circuit refused to extend
insider trading liability to corporate insiders who exercised stock
appreciation rights (SARs)n on the basis of material non-public
information.83 The court reasoned that "[u]nlike the exercise of puts,
calls, straddles or options, the 'exercise of the SARs... did not affect
the legal or beneficial ownership of any stock or the right to own,
purchase, or sell any stock..' ' . Further, the court rejected Clay's
argument that the SARs constituted "privileges with respect to""5
securities, as the SARs issued by Riverwood were non-transferable and
only entitled the holder to a cash payment from the company's treasury
(as opposed to company stock).86 Finally, the court noted that since no
market currently exists to trade SARs, its decision is consistent with the
well-established goal of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: "to
'protect the integrity of the securities markets."'"
On petition for rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that portion of
its decision in which it held that the SARs at issue were not securities
subject to insider trading laws, on the grounds that Clay lacked standing
to bring a claim under the Securities Exchange Act.88 However, given
the court's extensive discussion of the issue and given that the case was
one of first impression in the federal courts, the Eleventh Circuit's wellreasoned opinion retains probative value for purposes of this Comment.

79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1998).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).

81. 157F.3d 1259 (1lthCir. 1998), vacated, 176F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1999).
82. SARs are granted by corporations as a form of executive compensation. They
entitle the holder to a cash or stock payment in an amount equal to the difference
between the market value of the company's stock and the strike or grant price specified
on the face of the SAR. See id. at 1264.

83. See id.
84.

Id. at 1266 (quoting Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1559, 1571-

87.
88.

Id. at 1267 (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997)).
See Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 176 F.3d 1381, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1999).

72 (N.D. Ga. 1997)).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1264, 1266-67.
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E. Possession Versus Use

We now return to the question presented at the beginning of this
Comment: Is an insider guilty of unlawful insider trading merely
because he possesses material non-public information at the time that he
executes a trade? A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Smith89 answered this question in the
negative, creating a split of authority in the Circuit Courts.90
1.

Actual Use: United States v. Smith

In Smith, the U.S. Attorney brought a criminal action against Richard
Smith, PDA Engineering, Inc.'s (PDA) Vice President for North
American Sales, alleging eleven counts of insider trading in violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb591 Between June 10 and June 18, 1993, Smith sold all of the 51,445
PDA shares he owned and later sold short an additional 35,000 shares.'
In a voice mail to a co-worker, Smith indicated that he had engaged in
insider trading, stating, "I sold all my stock off on Friday and I'm going
to short the stock because I know its going to go down a couple of points
here in the next week as soon as... next year's earnings [are
released] ."'
On appeal from guilty verdicts on all eleven counts' Smith argued
that the lower court had "erroneously instructed the jury that it could
convict [him] based upon his mere possession, as opposed to his use, of
inside information.""5 Although the appellate court affirmed Smith's
conviction, it explicitly rejected the SEC's "knowing possession"
89.

90.

155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).

See Paul Beckett, Ruling Delivers a Blow to Efforts by SEC to Fight Insider

Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at B10 ("The issue may ultimately be decided by
the Supreme Court because the [Smith] ruling directly conflicts with a 1993 decision by
a federal appeals court in New York.").

91. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1053-54.
92. See id. at 1053. Selling short occurs when a market participant sells stock
which he does not own (at today's market price) based upon his belief that the market
price of the stock will decline. If the market price does decline, he will be permitted to
"cover," or tender delivery of the stock that he sold, by purchasing it at the lower price.
Thus, he realizes a profit equal to the difference between the sales price and his lower
purchase price. See id. at 1053 n.1.
93. Id. at 1053.
94.

See id. at 1054.

95.

Id. at 1055.
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standard for insider trading violations, finding it contrary to "the weight
of existing authority."" The court held that Rule 10b-5 requires that the
government (or the SEC) "demonstrate that the suspected inside trader
actually used material non[-]public information in consummating his
transaction."97

Recall the hypothetical situation presented in the introduction to this
Comment."
The Chief Executive Officer of a publicly traded
corporation instructed his stockbroker to sell a portion of his company
stock. Assume that despite his subsequent receipt of material and nonpublic information, the executive failed to cancel the transaction. In
order to secure a criminal conviction for insider trading under the Smith
approach, the SEC (or the government) must prove that the executive
traded on the basis of (or because of) material and non-public
information. Presumably, the executive in our hypothetical would easily
be able to overcome any such assertion by the SEC. He would simply
need to introduce evidence that his order to trade was communicated to
his stockbroker prior to his receipt of the information. In other words,
evidence that he had commenced the trade prior to his receipt of material
and non-public information would serve as an affirmative defense.
2.

Knowing Possession:United States v. Teicher

The holding in Smith directly conflicts with the reasoning of the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Teicher.9

In

Teicher, the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal action against defendants
Victor Teicher, founder of the investment firm of Victor Teicher & Co.,
and Ross Frankel, research analyst for Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.
(Drexel).'0° The prosecutor alleged eighteen counts, nine of which
involved securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5.''
Defendants Teicher and Frankel were involved in the business of "risk
96. Id. at 1069.
97. Id.

98. See supra Part I.

99. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). Many courts and commentators have dismissed

the Teichercourt's endorsement of a "knowing possession" standard, id. at 120, as dicta.

In fact, the Teicher court itself indicated that it "need only rule with respect to the case
before [it]" and thus, found it "unnecessary to determine whether proof of securities
fraud requires a causal connection." Id. at 121. However, the frequency with which the
Teicher decision has been cited and relied upon by commentators and in subsequent
decisions evidences its significant precedential influence. See, e.g., In re Oxford Health
Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508,
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Beckett, supra note 90, at B10.
100. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 114, 118.
101. Seeid.atll8.
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arbitrage.""l° From December 1985 until March 1986, Michael David,
an associate in the corporate department of the law firm of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (Paul Weiss), repeatedly provided Teicher
and Robert Salsbury, an employee of Frankel, with information
concerning possible acquisitions by Paul Weiss clients and other
confidential information obtained from Andrew Soloman, a trader at the
brokerage firm of Marcus Schloss, Inc.' 3 In addition, David provided
Teicher with the names of companies contained on Drexel's "phantom
list,"'0 4 which was obtained from Salsbury.' °5 Through the use of this
information, Teicher and Frankel realized profits in excess of
$180,0002'
On appeal from guilty verdicts on all eighteen counts, Teicher and
Frankel argued that the lower court had "erroneously instructed the jury
that the defendants could be [convicted] based upon the mere possession
of... material non[-]public information without regard to whether this
information was the actual cause of the sale or purchase of securities."'' 7
The appellate court affirmed the convictions and endorsed the SEC's
"knowing possession" standard with respect to insider trading
violations. 1"8 Specifically, the court indicated that "[u]nlike a loaded
weapon which may stand ready but unused, material information can not
lay idle in the human brain."' 9 Thus, an insider's mere possession of
material, non-public information taints a subsequent trade and renders it
illegal regardless of the insider's subjective motivation at the time the
trade was executed."
Based upon the court's reasoning in Teicher, the executive in our
hypothetical would be guilty of unlawful insider trading despite the fact
that his trade was made pursuant to a pre-existing plan to diversify his
holdings. Thus, under Teicher, evidence that the executive had
102.

Id. at 114. Arbitrage involves trading in the corporate stock of companies that

are potentially subject to changes in corporate control in an effort to profit from
fluctuations in the market price of the securities. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 115. "Drexel's 'phantom list' [was] a highly confidential list of
companies that were the subject of mergers or takeovers by Drexel clients and in which

trading by Drexel personnel was [strictly] prohibited." Id.
105. See id. at 114.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id. at 115-17.
Id. at 119.
See id. at 120-21.
Id. at 120.
See id. at 120-21.
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communicated the trade to his stockbroker prior to receiving the material
and non-public information would not shield him from liability under
the insider trading laws.
3.

Presumption of Use upon Proofof Possession:SEC v. Adler

In SEC v. Adler," ' the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a
different approach. In Adler, the SEC brought a civil action against
several executives and former executives of Comptronix Corporation

(Comptronix) alleging insider trading in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5."2
On September 14, 1989, defendant Pegram, a former executive of
Comptronix, attended a meeting of the Comptronix Board of Directors.
During this meeting it was reported that the company was expecting
either a complete termination or a substantial reduction in the orders
Between September 19 and
from one of its largest customers.'
September 26, 1989, Pegram sold 20,000 shares of Comptronix stock,
approximately two weeks before a press release containing the14
information discussed at the board meeting was issued to the public."
In response to the press release, the price of Comptronix stock dropped
one dollar per share, from $3.63 to $2.63, in two days." 5 By trading
prior to the press release, Pegram was able to avoid approximately
$17,625 in losses." 6
Approximately three years later, Richard Adler, an outside director of
Comptronix, attended a November 15, 1992 special meeting of
Comptronix's board at which the directors were informed about
potential fraud perpetrated by Comptronix's CEO and Vice-President." 7'
News of the fraud was reported to the public in a press release on
November 25, 1992. "8 On November 16, 1992, Pegram called Adler's
home in Taiwan." 9 Following their conversation, Pegram called his
wife, who then called their stock broker and sold 50,000 shares of
Comptronix stock.' ° Over the next eight days, the Pegrams sold an
additional 100,000 shares of Comptronix stock, avoiding losses of

111.
112.
113.

137 F.3d 1325 (llthCir. 1998).
See id. at 1327.
See id. at 1328.

114.

See id.

116.
117.

See id.
See id. at 1329.

115.

See id.

118. See id.
119. See id.
120.
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2
approximately $2.3 million.' '
On appeal from summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law
in favor of Pegram with respect to the 1989 and 1992 trades,

respectively, the SEC argued that the lower court incorrectly adopted a
causal connection standard for insider trading violations 2 Although the
appellate court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law, the court rejected the SEC's "knowing
possession" standard.' However, in an effort to alleviate the difficulties
associated with proving that an alleged violator acted on the basis of
material information, the court held that "when an insider trades while in
possession of material non[-]public information, a strong inference
arises that such information was used by the insider in trading."'' The
insider may attempt to rebut the inference by presenting evidence that
there was no causal connection between the information and his decision
to trade."2
Applying the Adler approach to our hypothetical, proof that the
executive possessed material and non-public information at the time the
trade was executed would result in a presumption that the executive
made the trade based upon such information. The executive could then
rebut this presumption by presenting evidence of his pre-existing plan to
diversify his stock holdings.

Ill.

ANALYSIS

The threshold question is whether the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, require the application of
a "knowing possession" or an "actual use" standard for insider trading
violations. Although the legislature has recently taken up discussion of
insider trading in conjunction with its adoption of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA)' 26 and the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA),' 7 it has declined to endorse a

121.

See id.

122.

See id. at 1331-32.

123.

See id. at 1337, 1343.

124. Id. at 1337.
125. See id.
126. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5, 98 Stat. 1264, 1265 (1984) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994)).
127. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (1988) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994)).
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formal definition of the offense.' Congress based its decision on the
belief that "the court-drawn parameters of insider trading have
established clear guidelines for the vast majority of traditional insider
trading cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be

narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the

law."'29 Accordingly, Congress indicated that its legislation was not
intended to alter the existing substantive law with respect to insider

trading."' The significant differences in interpretation of the insider
trading laws within the federal courts, however, indicate that courtdrawn parameters of insider trading are anything but clear.
A.

StatutoryAnalysis Based on PlainLanguage

The Supreme Court has held that when interpreting statutory
language, courts must first look to the plain language of the statute. 3'
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ....[t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security ....any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the
32
protection of investors.

Rule lOb-5 further states:
It shall be unlawful for any person... [t]o employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud ....[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made...
not misleading, or... [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in
33
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 explicitly addresses the
issue of whether mere possession of material non-public information is
sufficient to impose liability on a corporate insider, the language
"suggests a focus on fraud, deception, and manipulation,"' 4 and thus
requires proof that the insider traded on the basis of the information by
implication. Of course, contrary interpretations are possible. One such

interpretation focuses exclusively on the requirement that a deceptive
practice be conducted "in connection with the purchase or sale of a
128. See Horwich, supra note 8, at 1263.
129. Id. at 1262 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted il 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048).
130. See id. at 1263.
131. See Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
134. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1333 (1lth Cir. 1998).
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security.' 35 Under this interpretation, the "in connection with" clause is
construed broadly to include deceptive practices merely "touching" the
sale of securities.'36 Under this approach, for example, "the predicate act
of fraud may be perpetrated on the source of the non-public information,
even though the source may be unaffiliated with the buyer or seller of
securities."'37 Arguably, this interpretation loses sight of the law's main
thrust. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 do not just prohibit certain
unspecified acts in connection with the purchase or sale of securities;
rather, "they prohibit the employment of 'manipulative' and 'deceptive'
tradingpracticesin connection with those transactions.' 38
Another interpretation asserts that trading while in possession of

material and non-public information in and of itself constitutes a
"deceptive" practice, as one who trades while knowingly possessing
material non-public information has an informational advantage over
other market participants.' 39 However, this interpretation fails to
consider the "use or employ" language contained in both section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.
In Adler, the court seemed to concede that the language of Rule lOb-5
does not provide courts with adequate guidance. Nevertheless, the court
rejected the SEC's "knowing possession" standard on the grounds that
the SEC "has had ample opportunity to adopt a rule or amend Rule lOb5 so as [explicitly] to provide that a trade with knowing possession of
material non[-]public information triggers insider trading liability."' In
support of its position, the court cited the language of Rule 14e, which
augments the insider trading prohibitions of Rule lOb-5 in the context of
tender offers. 4' Specifically, Rule 14e-3(a) states:

135. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
136. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
137. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991). Literally, even
this interpretation seems to imply that liability only results if the insider engages in
"fraudulent" or "deceitful" activity. The decision merely expands the type of activity
that can be used to secure a conviction. For example, this interpretation is consistent
with the interpretation used by courts in order to justify insider trading liability based on
the misappropriation of confidential information. See supra Part ll.A.3.
138. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
139. See id.

140.
141.

SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1339 (11th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1338. A tender offer is a "public offer to buy a minimum number of

shares from a corporation's shareholders at a fixed price, usu[ally] at a substantial
premium over the market price, in an effort to take control of the corporation." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (7th ed. 1999).
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If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer... , it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for
any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such
tender offer.., to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such
securities ...unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such
information142 and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or
otherwise.

Thus, Rule 14e expressly provides for insider trading liability based
solely upon an individual's possession of material non-public
information relating to a tender offer. According to the Adler court, the

absence of such43explicit language in Rule lOb-5 weighs heavily in favor
of a "use" test.'

B. Statutoy Analysis Based on Legislative History
Although the above analysis of the statutory language of section 10(b)

and Rule 1Ob-5 seems to favor an "actual use" standard, the meaning of
the language certainly cannot be described as clear. Thus, consideration4

of the legislative history is appropriate. In United States v. O'Hagan,1
the Supreme Court articulated the legislature's goal in passing the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934-to maintain the integrity of the
securities markets. 45 In particular, the legislative history of the act
expresses the legislature's desire to eliminate the public's perception that

"the use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal
emolument of corporate office.'9 46
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,47 the Supreme
Court cited similar legislative concerns with respect to the public's faith

142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1998).
143. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339. Note that the court's assumption about the SEC's
rulemaking authority is of questionable validity. Section 14(e) provides that "[the SEC]
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994). In contrast, section 10(b) provides
that it shall be unlawful "[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). "Thus,
[s]ection 10(b) does not give the SEC the same authority to make rules 'reasonably
designed to prevent' any acts and practices which may violate the statute as does
[s]ection 14(e), but rather only the authority to proscribe the deceptive devices
themselves." John H. Sturc & Catharine W. Cummer, Possession vs. Use for Insider
Trading Liability, INSIGHTS, June 1998, at 3, *3.

144.

521 U.S. 642 (1997).

145.
146.
147.

See id. at 653.
hi re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961).
486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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in the legal system.'
In that case, Health Services Acquisition
Corporation (Health Services) brought an action against John Liljeberg,
Jr., seeking a declaration of ownership of a corporation known as St.
Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana (St. Jude).149 Judge Robert Collins
tried the case and held in favor of Liljeberg"5 After the judgment had
been rendered, Health Services learned that Judge Collins served as a
member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola University while Liljeberg
was negotiating with the University to purchase a parcel of land on
which to construct a hospital. 51 Further, the benefit to Loyola of these
negotiations depended on Liljeberg prevailing in the litigation before
Judge Collins.' Based upon this information, Health Services moved to
vacate the judgment on the ground that Judge Collins was disqualified
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)."
Although the Court was satisfied that Judge Collins' decision was not
influenced by the conflict of interest, it was nevertheless concerned that
the integrity of the judicial system may be adversely affected by the
mere appearance of impartiality."M Further, the Court expressed concern
that requiring scienter as an element of section 455(a) would
"contravene that section's... purpose of promoting public confidence in
the ote
f th ud,,155
the integrity of the judicial system. 56 Accordingly, the Court ruled that
vacatur was an appropriate remedy.
A similar argument could be made with respect to the issue presented
in this Comment. If insiders are permitted to trade while in possession
of material non-public information, market participants may perceive
that the insiders are being afforded an informational advantage, even if
they are not actually "using" the information to trade. As a result of this
perception, the integrity of the market may be compromised. Based
upon this argument, it appears that a "knowing possession" standard
would be most consistent with the legislature's stated goal of

maintaining the public's faith in the securities markets.

148. See id. at 859-60.
149. See id. at 850.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. Title 28, section 455(a) of the United States Code requires a judge to
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994).
153. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 850.
154. See id. at 848.
155. Id.
156. See id.
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C. The Supreme Court's Perspective

Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
discussed herein, it has repeatedly suggested in dicta that Rule lOb-5
requires that the government prove causation in insider trading
prosecutions. For example, in O'Hagan, 7 the Court implied that a
prosecutor must prove that an insider actually used the information in
order to secure a conviction, stating that "[u]nder the 'traditional' or
'classical theory' of insider trading liability, [section] 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his
158
corporation on the basis of material, non[-]public information."'
Similarly, the Court has referred to the duty of an insider not to trade
based on inside information in several other cases.'59 However, in each
of these cases, the Supreme Court was presented with fact patterns in
which "there was no question that the material [and] non[-]public
information was actually used in trading. ' ' 6 Therefore, it is unclear
whether the Court intended these statements to endorse an "actual use"
standard. On the contrary, the Court's statements could be interpreted as
merely communicating the Court's belief that the particular defendant's
actions (i.e., trading on the basis of material and non-public information)
were sufficient to impose liability under the insider trading laws.
D. The SEC's Perspective
1.

Insider'sDuty to "Disclose or Abstain"

The SEC's current position is clear: If an insider trades while in
possession of material non-public information, he is "taking advantage
of his position to the detriment of the public.' 16' Accordingly, "Rule

1Ob-5 does not require a showing that an insider sold his securities for62
the purpose of taking advantage of material non-public information.'

The Commission's earlier decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.'63 also

appears to support this position.
Specifically, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. the Commission introduced
157. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
158. Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (referring to the "duty
that insiders owe... not to trade on inside information") (emphasis added); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (referring to the unfairness associated with
allowing an insider to take advantageof confidential information).
160. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 1998).
161. In re Sterling Drug, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,570, at 80,298 (Apr.

18, 1978).
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163.
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the oft-quoted maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to hold
material, non-public information in confidence must either "disclose or
abstain" with respect to trading.'" Although the Commission did not
explicitly state that possession of material non-public information was
sufficient to sustain a conviction, its requirement that an insider either
"disclose or abstain" seems absolute. The Commission stated that
"insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue
of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they
deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.""'6
Since material information, by definition, is information that would
affect an investor's investment judgment, it follows that all such
information held by an insider is subject to the "disclose or abstain"
requirement. Further, the Commission did not limit the requirement to
trades executed on the basis of confidential information. On the
contrary, the Commission indicated'that "any sales by the insider must
await disclosure of the information." 66
2.

Weight of AdministrativeInterpretation

The Supreme Court has consistently held that when a court interprets
an administrative regulation, "the ultimate criterion" is the agency's
interpretation of the regulation, which becomes of controlling weight

unless that interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation."' 67 This position seems to favor judicial deference to the
SEC's current interpretation of Rule lOb-5 in favor of a "possession"
standard.
In In re Investors Management Co.,(" however, the SEC seemed to
favor an "actual use" standard. In that case, the defendant investment
advisers, mutual funds, and investment partnerships had received
material and non-public information concerning Douglas Aircraft
Company (Douglas) from employees of Merrill Lynch (Merrill Lynch),

164. See id. at911.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 914 (emphasis added). Note that application of the "disclose or abstain"
rule may result in an undesired effect. Specifically, forcing an insider to cancel a
transaction (i.e., to abstain) when he obtains material and non-public information may
have the effect of tipping others (primarily brokers) that new information has come into
existence. See Horwich, supranote 8,at 1274.
167. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
168. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
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the prospective underwriter of Douglas securities. 6 9 Upon receipt of this
information, defendants sold a total of 133,400 shares of Douglas stock

from existing long positions, which represented virtually all of their
holdings of Douglas stock. Additionally, they sold short 21,100 shares,

for a total price of more than $13,300,00070 In identifying the requisite
elements for the imposition of liability under the securities laws, the
Commission included a requirement that "the information be a factor in
[the individual's] decision to effect the transaction."''M While the

Commission's change of heart is not fatal to its current position, 7 ' it is
surely relevant to this Comment's analysis. 73

E. Use of SARs as Executive Compensation
It is certainly true that there is "an element of unfairness" associated

with "taking from someone the profits he would have achieved (or
imposing upon him the loss he would have avoided) when the decision
to trade was made without any exploitation of material non[-]public
information."'' Further, corporate management always has information
available to it that could be construed as material and that is not readily

available to stockholders or the investing public.'75 Thus, adoption of a
"knowing possession" standard would, arguably, have the effect of
absolutely forbidding insiders from trading stocks held in their company.
Given the significant use of stock options as a means of compensation,

this result is unacceptable. 7
The Eleventh Circuit's recent decision concerning the use of SARs,
however, may provide a reasonable alternative.'77 In Clay, 78 the
defendant, Riverwood International Corporation (Riverwood), had
169.
170.

See id. at 636-37.
See id. at 636.

171. Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
172. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978) ("An
administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the
courts.., should not approach the.., issue de novo and without regard to the
administrative understanding of the statutes.").
173. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (citing "consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements" as a relevant consideration in determining the
persuasiveness of an agency ruling).
174. Horwich, supranote 8, at 1271.
175. See Fleischer, supranote 70, at 1288.
176. See Kelly Smith, America's Best Company Benefits, MONEY MAGAZINE, Oct.
1, 1999, at 116, 125 (reporting that seventeen percent of the 350 large, domestic
companies surveyed in 1999 had granted stock options to fifty percent or more of their
staffs).
177. See supra Part II.D.2.
178. Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 157 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated, 176
F.3d 1381 (1lth Cir. 1999).
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granted a specified number of SARs as part of senior management
benefits. 79 Under the terms of the SARs agreement, Riverwood officers
would receive payment from the company treasury equal to the
difference between the grant price of the SARs and the fair market value
of Riverwood's stock at the time they exercised them.'80 "The agreement
further provided that the SARs (1) did not contain any stockholder
rights; (2) were not options or offers to sell stock; and (3) could not be
sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred."'81
On September 21, 1995, when the value of Riverwood's stock reached
$25.25 per share, "Riverwood officers exercised many of their SARs,
The court assumed
collectively receiving over $7,000,000 in cash."''
that these trades were made on the basis of material and non-public
Rather, in rejecting the plaintiff' s contention that the
information.'
officers had violated the insider trading laws, the court held that the
SARs, which entitled the corporate officers to cash payment rather than
corporate stock, were not securities subject to the "disclose or abstain"
insider trading laws'
As previously discussed in Part II.D.2, on petition for rehearing, the
Eleventh Circuit vacated that portion of its opinion in which it held that
the SARs at issue were not subject to federal insider trading laws on the
grounds that Clay lacked standing.' 5 However, given that this case was
one of first impression in the federal courts, the Eleventh Circuit's
thorough and well-reasoned opinion provides valuable guidance.
Specifically, by structuring a SAR agreement materially similar to the
one at issue in Clay, a company may be able to obtain the benefit of a
traditional stock option plan (i.e., tying executive compensation to the
company's market performance) without exposing corporate officers to
the potential liability associated with insider trading laws. Given the
possibility of this alternative, the concern that a "knowing possession"
standard would entirely preclude insiders from trading in their
company's stock loses some force.'86
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 1261.
See id.
Id.

182. Id. at 1262.
183. See id. at 1264.
184. See id. at 1267.
185. See Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 176 F.3d 1381 (1lth Cir. 1999).
186. Presumably, the cost to the company of issuing a cash value SAR would
approximate the cost of issuing a stock option. In the case of a stock option, the
company "grants" the executive company stock held in the company treasury. The
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F. Burden of Proof
The most persuasive argument cited in favor of the "knowing
possession" standard concerns the difficulty associated with proving that
an insider has acted on the basis of material non-public information, as
"the motivations for the trader's decision to trade are... peculiarly
within the trader's knowledge.""'
Thus, as a matter of policy, a
requirement of a causal connection between the information and the
trade "could frustrate attempts to distinguish between legitimate trades
and those conducted in connection with inside information.""'
The
difficulty associated with proving the motivations behind an individual's
actions has been a significant factor in shaping the law in several areas,
including employment discrimination in violation of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).'89
1.

Use of Burden Shifting in Employment Law

With respect to employment discrimination in violation of Title VII,
courts have acknowledged that "[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness'
testimony as to the employer's mental processes."' 9 In order to
overcome this obstacle, the Supreme Court has adopted an initial
rebuttable presumption in favor of the plaintiff. 9' Thus, in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,'92 the Supreme Court indicated that the
complainant in a Title VII action carries the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case of racial discrimination.'93 In Title VII disparate
treatment cases,' 94 this may be accomplished by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for

a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of

executive makes a profit by selling the appreciated stock for a price in excess of the grant
price. In the case of a SAR, the company pays the executive, in cash, the difference
between the value of the appreciated stock and the SAR grant price. This payment can
be funded by the sale of appreciated company stock held in the company treasury.
187. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998).
188. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1993).
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
190. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983).

191.

192.

Seeid. at714.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

193. See id. at 802.

194. Under Title VII jurisprudence, discrimination claims have been separated into
three categories: disparate treatment, mixed motive, and disparate impact. The prima
facie test varies by type of discrimination claim. See MARK A. RoTHsTEIN & LANCE
LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw: CASES AND MATERiALs 232-75 (4th ed. 1998).
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complainant's qualifications.

95

Once these elements have been established, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection.' 96 The complainant must then be
provided ample opportunity to show that the employer's stated reasons
for rejection were merely pretext (i.e., that the reasons given were
intended to cover up what was, in fact, a racially discriminatory
decision).'97 Under this scheme, the court must award judgment to the
plaintiff as a matter of law at the close of the defendant's case if, based
upon the evidence presented, "(1) any rational person would have to find
the existence of facts constituting a prima facie case [of discrimination],
and (2) the defendant.., has failed to introduce [any] evidence which,
taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action."'99 The Federal Rules
of Evidence provide:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it
is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on

whom it was originally cast. 199

Accordingly, in Texas Departmentof Community Affairs v. Burdine,200
the Supreme Court warned that although the McDonnell Douglas
presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant in disparate
treatment cases, "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at

all times with the plaintiff." '' Thus, in order to rebut the presumption of
discriminatory intent, the defendant is not required to persuade the trier
of fact that it was actually motivated by the reasons that it has offered

195.

McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.

196.

Id.

197. See id. at 804. The Court offered several examples of evidence that may be
relevant to a showing of pretext, including facts as to the company's treatment of the
plaintiff during a prior term of employment, the company's response, if any, to the
plaintiffs legitimate civil rights activities, and the company's general policy and practice
with respect to minority employment. See id. at 804-05.
198. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
199. FED. R. EvID. 301.
200. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
201. Id. at 253.
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into evidence. 2° Rather, the defendant succeeds in meeting its burden of
production by merely putting forth nondiscriminatory reasons for the
rejection, irrespective of their persuasive effect. 23 Once the defendant
has met its burden, the presumption of discriminatory intent
disappears.2 4
In deciding the ultimate question of whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race, the
trier of fact's disbelief of the nondiscriminatory reasons for rejection
offered by the defendant may be considered.205 Further, such disbelief,
coupled with the elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to support
a finding of discriminatory intent.2" However, the mere fact that the
factfinder does not believe the reasons for rejection offered by the
defendant is not sufficient to sustain a finding of discriminatory intent.
Ultimately, the factfinder must be persuaded that the employer has
unlawfully discriminated.w
2.

Use of Burden Shifting in Civil Insider Trading Cases

In order to compensate for the difficulty inherent in requiring that a
plaintiff prove a causal connection between an insider's possession of
material non-public information and his decision to trade, a presumption
similar to that used in employment discrimination cases could be applied
in insider trading cases. This is the approach taken by the Eleventh
Circuit Court in Adler."3 Specifically, the Adler court held that in a civil
enforcement action against investors for alleged insider trading
violations, the complainant carries the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case by producing evidence that the insider traded while in
possession of material non-public information.' Once the complainant
has met this burden, "a strong inference arises that such information was
used by the insider in trading."21 The insider can attempt to rebut this
inference by producing evidence that the trade was not motivated by the
information (e.g., by producing evidence that the trade was made
pursuant to a pre-existing plan). " Finally, the factfinder must weigh all
of the evidence and make a finding of fact as to whether the information
202.
203.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See id. at 254.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510-11.

See id.
See id. at 511.
See id.
See id.
See supraPart II.E.3.
209. See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11 th Cir. 1998).
210. Id.
211. See id.
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212

was used in violation of the law.
Although the Adler court did not explicitly state whether its
presumption had the effect of shifting the burden of production or the
burden of persuasion to the defendant, we must assume, given the
absence of an Act of Congress providing otherwise, that the court
intended to comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 3 Therefore, in
applying the Adler presumption, it is imperative that courts remember
that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact... [must]
remain[] at all times with the plaintiff.' 2" 4 Accordingly, as the Court
indicated in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,215 the mere fact that the
factfinder does not believe the reasons offered by the defendant is not
sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff?26 The factfinder
must be persuaded that the insider has unlawfully engaged in insider
trading in order to render judgment against him.
3.

Use of Burden Shifting in CriminalInsider Trading Cases

It is unclear whether the Adler presumption could be constitutionally
applied in criminal insider trading actions. The Fifth Amendment
carries a guarantee: "No person shall be... deprived of... liberty...
7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
without due process of law .... 2 ,
held that with respect to criminal actions, any presumption which
conflicts with the "overriding presumption of innocence with which the
2 8
law endows the accused" will be rejected on constitutional grounds '
Further, the Court has indicated that since conclusive (or mandatory)
presumptions have the effect of invading the fact-finding function, they
suffer from constitutional infirmities.2 9 Likewise, "A presumption
212. See id.
213. As discussed supra Part IIl.E.1, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party
on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EvID. 301 (emphasis added).
214. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
215. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
216. Seeid. at511.
217. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
218. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
219. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,521-23 (1979).
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which, although not conclusive, ha[s] the effect of shifting the burden of
persuasion to [the] petitioner, would... suffer[] from similar
infirmities." '
In reliance upon such statements, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Smith2 'l indicated that since it was faced with a criminal prosecution
(as opposed to a civil enforcement proceeding) it was not at liberty, as

was the Adler court, to establish an evidentiary presumption giving rise
to an inference of use.2n The court may have been a bit hasty in its
conclusion. In County Court v. Allen,m the Supreme Court reasoned

that unlike a mandatory or conclusive presumption, a permissive
inference or presumption "leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject
the inference and does not shift the burden of proof." 4 Thus, "it affects
the application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if,
under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make
the connection permitted by the inference." m Based upon this finding,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York trial judge's
instructions to the jury that "[t]he presence in an automobile, other than
a stolen one or a public omnibus, of any firearm... is presumptive
evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at
the time such weapon.., is found."'
Although the Court initially indicated that the type of presumption
applied in Adler (i.e., a presumption that "shift[s] the burden of
production to the defendant, following the satisfaction of which the
ultimate burden of persuasion returns to the prosecution") would
traditionally be classified as a "mandatory" presumption,2 it later stated
that "[t]o the extent that a presumption imposes an extremely low burden
of production [on the defendant]-e.g., being satisfied by 'any'
evidence-it may well be that its impact is no greater than that of' ' a
permissive inference, and it may be proper to analyze it as such.
Further, application of a permissible presumption to criminal insider
trading actions would not fail the "rational connection" test, as there is a
"rational connection [between the use and possession of confidential

information] which is more likely true than not."'n9
Thus, it appears that so long as courts are careful to (1) thoroughly
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 524.
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1069.

223.

442 U.S. 140 (1979).

224.

Id. at 157.

225.

Id.

228.
229.

Id.
Horwich, supra note 8, at 1278.

226.
227.
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instruct the jury that they may, but are not required to, infer the
elemental fact (i.e., actual use of the confidential information) from
proof by the prosecutor of the basic one (i.e., possession of the
confidential information), and (2) limit the defendant's burden of
production, the presumption applied in Adler would pass constitutional
muster even in the criminal insider trading context.
IV. CONCLUSION

As this Comment indicates, insider trading law remains unsettled and
persuasive arguments are cited on all sides. The large majority of cases
clearly require a showing of a causal connection between the
information and the insider's decision to trade. However, there is a
conflict among these cases about whether an inference of use arises upon
proof of possession.
To date, the use of a presumption to establish a causal connection
between an insider's possession of material non-public information and
his decision to trade has been recognized in only a small number of
cases. This is unfortunate, as this approach seems to provide a fair
alternative, in both civil and criminal contexts, to dealing with alleged

violations of the securities laws.

Application of a presumption is

consistent with the plain language of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
which seem to favor an "actual use" standard. Further, in lieu of
assigning the complainant the potentially insurmountable task of proving
that the defendant traded on the basis of or because of material nonpublic information, it provides the complainant with the benefit of a
strong inference of use upon proof of possession. Moreover, the
inference created by proof of possession establishes a prima facie case of
insider trading sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Despite this,
application of the presumption is inherently fair to the defendant, as it
permits him to rebut the inference by merely introducing evidence of a
pre-existing plan to dispose of the stock, thus guaranteeing him the
benefit of trades which were not influenced by his receipt of confidential
information.
Thus, the issue presented in this Comment should be resolved by the
legislative adoption of an initial rebuttable presumption in favor of the
complainant.
TERI E. O'BRIEN
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